Lessons Learned:
Followup On Foss Maritime Barge 248-P2 Oil Spill
Background: There were sixteen lessons in the “lessons learned” report issued after the Foss Maritime barge spill at Point Wells. In addition, upon receiving this report, Ecology selected four lessons and put them in the foreword of the report as those considered most important. Those four lessons are discussed below, followed by the original sixteen lessons provided by the consultant. Also shown are the followup actions that Ecology has taken since the spill in December 2003. Finally, this summary includes an indication of how these lessons were acted upon during the mid-October 2004 Dalco Passage oil spill.
Ecology’s Top Four Lessons Learned from the Foss Maritime Barge Oil Spill, December 2003
1. Lesson: Trained Beach Cleaners and Immediate Access to Beach Cleaning Equipment
Actions:
2. Lesson: Tracking Oil at Night
Actions:
3. Lesson: Immediate and Sufficient Aircraft
Actions:
4. Lesson: Rigorous Drill Program Including Unannounced Drills
Actions:
September 2004.
Genwest Systems, Inc. recommendations appear below. The bolded recommendations below are similar to the four chosen by Ecology, above. Following are Genwest’s Foss Barge spill recommendations and Ecology’s followup:
1. Lesson: Safety is always the most important objective. Document concerns and aggressively pursue the issue.
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2. Lesson: Need to have more than one person monitoring oil transfers.
Actions:
3. Lesson: Equipment critical to the initial response must be in proper working order at all times.
Actions:
4. Lesson: Continuous aerial observation of the oil and coordination of skimmers are critical, especially in the early hours of a response.
Actions:
5. Do not rely entirely on trajectory model information for slick movement information. Take advantage of available infrared technology to position skimmers in darkness.
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6. EDRC is a planning standard and should not be used as an actual capability. If the oil is not contained immediately before it has a chance to thin and spread out over a wide area, low recovery volumes will result regardless of how much EDRC is available to fight the problem (excerpt from the report). Derive a more meaningful planning standard.
Actions:
7. Since an early response is difficult, assume the oil will impact beaches. More trained SCAT personnel are needed.
Actions:
October 6, 2004.
8. Lesson: Any spill in Puget Sound is likely to go ashore. The next one could easily require more trained beach cleaners than this incident.
Actions:
9. Lesson: While the initial trajectory was in error, it did not cause a significant problem in resource allocation. Do not depend on a trajectory model as the sole source of information for the oil slick movement, especially when the source is close to shore.
Actions:
10. Lesson: Check-in personnel need to ensure that everyone entering the Command Post has an ICS position or role. It is better to overreact with the number of personnel and there must be one and only one Situation Display. If the Situation Unit and Operations are close together it is easier to make this happen.
Actions:
· Established comprehensive training program, DRILLTRAC, and completed full Incident Command System (ICS) training of all 65 Ecology staff by summer of 2004.
· Established fully assigned and trained Incident Management Assist Team (IMAT) by summer of 2004.
· Held internal all-staff drill in September. The scenario was a mystery (no responsible party) spill on the Columbia River.
· Immediately began working on the lessons learned during that drill; for example, equipment gaps.
· Dalco Passage Spill Relevance: The U.S. Coast Guard and Ecology deployed full IMAT to command center and field positions.
· Dalco Passage Spill Relevance: Effectively blended Ecology and U.S. Coast Guard personnel to complete the spill management organization.
· Dalco Passage Spill Relevance: Effectively filled the command and general staffs.
· Dalco Passage Spill Relevance: Specifically included Command Center check-in station from the first day through the entire response. All staff were fully employed; however, the lesson on the importance of check-in was reinforced during this response by the large number of people who showed up at the command post and were organized, managed, and assigned.
· Dalco Passage Spill Relevance: Unified Command ensured adequate staffing continuously throughout the spill. When shortages were observed, additional staff was reassigned or temporarily reassigned to cover the shortages.
· Dalco Passage Spill Relevance: Situation Unit fully staffed from the beginning of the incident. The spill situation was effectively displayed and maintained for the Command Post.
· Dalco Passage Spill Relevance: A Demobilization Plan was developed even before the first resources were demobilized from the spill. This phase of the response was done in an orderly manner.
11. Follow up on objectives to ensure they are being addressed. Disposal plan was late.
Actions:
· Increased emphasis in DRILLTRAC training on incident objectives and disposal plans.
· Dalco Passage Spill Relevance: Incident objectives (Form 202) rigorously updated and followed.
· Dalco Passage Spill Relevance: Disposal plan was begun immediately. The plan ensured proper waste disposal and tracking of waste throughout the response.
12. Wildlife impacts could have been much worse. Need to plan for Worst Case Discharge. More ICS training for Wildlife responders.
Actions:
· Wildlife care standards were developed by rule in September 2004 by Washington Department of Fish and Wildlife.
· DRILLTRAC ICS training planned for natural resource agencies beginning in 2005.
· Dalco Passage Spill Relevance: Wildlife Branch staff and care trailers on-scene timely and effective in handling wildlife issues.
· Dalco Passage Spill Relevance: Handling large-scale wildlife casualties still an issue.
13. Lesson: Tribes need ICS training - emphasize the need for them to send more people to spills, especially those authorized to speak for the tribes.
Actions:
· DRILLTRAC planning to include tribal members in 2005 training.
· Dalco Passage Spill Relevance: New legislation requires tribal notification; no failures in Dalco Passage spill.
· Dalco Passage Spill Relevance: Tribal cultural resources were protected by the hiring of an archeologist for the response.
14. Lesson: Who can put up a
website? Are the photos the issue?
Actions:
· Full update on procedure issued on October 7, 2004, in new Spill Response Operations Manual.
· Dalco Passage Spill Relevance: A Joint Information Center (JIC) was established and Ecology posted JIC information on its website.
15. Lesson: Modify GRPs identified as needing changes in this spill response. Develop procedure for approving deviation from the GRPs.
Actions:
· GRPs are updated as staff time is available. The updates are posted on the Ecology website.
· Dalco Passage Spill Relevance: One of the GRPs was identified as an area of cultural resource concern. The GRP strategy was modified on-the-spot so as not to harm the cultural resource.
· Dalco Passage Spill Relevance: Notes taken on GRP performance. Corrections will be put into effect if necessary after the spill debrief.
· Dalco Passage Spill Relevance: Protective strategies for resources identified during the response (but not identified as GRPs) were deployed during the spill.
· Dalco Passage Spill Relevance: Debriefing of the spill will include a discussion of the effectiveness of the GRPs.
16. Lesson: Continue working on
transponder software.
Actions:
· The software was tested at a recent U.S. Coast Guard/Navy deployment exercise with mixed results.
· This project is under continuing development; however, it suffers from no budget and very limited staff time. Technical problems exist in the area of communications.